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Comments 209 
In his recent.JEParticle, Theodore Bergstrom 
(Spring 2002, pp. 67-88) joins a small but 
210 Journal of Economic Perspectives 
distinguished group of economists who have 
seriously considered the implications of group 
selection for the conduct of economic inquiry 
and the assumptions we make about human na- 
ture. Until recently, this group has essentially 
been limited to Gary Becker, Friedrich Hayek, 
Jack Hirshleifer and Paul Samuelson. Each of 
these has not only acknowledged the possibility 
of group level selection (uncontroversial among 
biologists), but more significantly, has written 
sympathetically about the possibility that this 
variant of natural selection has left lasting im- 
prints on human behavioral predispositions. 
This note is concerned with one specific claim 
in Bergstrom's article, however, which I think is 
wrong or, at best, misleading: the claim that in 
"haystack" models, group composition must be 
assortative in order for group selection to attain 
any traction. 
The intuition behind Bergstrom's "theorem" 
is clear. If altruists interact with defectors, they 
will have relatively fewer offspring than the de- 
fectors at any moment in time. Only if group 
composition is assortative, requiring that altru- 
ists have some way of seeking each other out and 
differentially associating with each other, can 
they benefit from their shared altruism and gain 
in a way that would increase the proportion of 
altruistic offspring in the population. 
In haystack models, populations separate into 
groups or demes for one or several generations 
before merging and then reassorting. Berg- 
strom's logic is premised on the assumption of 
very large numbers in the individual groups. He 
argues that if the overall population is large and 
groups are "formed by random sampling with- 
out replacement from this population, then 
matching will be almost nonassortative" (p. 71). 
My claim is that the assumption of very large 
numbers is unrealistic if it is intended to apply to 
any actual demographic situation under which 
group selection might apply. Why does this mat- 
ter? If the numbers are small, random variation 
alone will almost certainly produce variation in 
the percentages of altruists within each group. 
Bergstrom, in fact, acknowledges this: "In hay- 
stack models, random group formation pro- 
duces some groups with more cooperators than 
others" (p. 71). So long as there is some varia- 
tion in these frequencies, so that altruists are in 
some cases grouped together, group selection 
has the potential to act in a manner that causes 
the frequency of altruists in the general popula- 
tion to rise. This can happen even if the altruists 
are declining in each and every group at any 
moment of time-as long as the groups with 
relatively more altruists have a greater number 
of total offspring. And it can happen even 
though there is no mechanism whereby altruists 
seek out others similarly inclined and try to join 
groups differentially composed of them. 
My point is related to that used to account for 
genetic drift, and is based on the statistical prop- 
erties of small samples. If you flip a true coin, 
there is a 50:50 chance of getting a head or a tail. 
It does not follow, however, that if you choose 
groups of 10, you will always end up with five 
heads and five tails. The larger the size of the 
group, of course, the smaller will be the variance 
of the actual population shares around a mean 
of a fifty-fifty split. But a variance will remain. 
Suppose mutation or genetic recombination 
has created a small number of altruistically in- 
clined individuals. We are concerned with 
whether natural selection can allow these genes 
to persist. Suppose these individuals comprise 
10 percent of the total population. Let n = 100 
and have the population assort periodically into 
10 equally sized haystacks. It is quite unlikely 
that each group will end up with nine defectors 
and one altruist. Perhaps the ten haystacks 
would include one that contains three altruistic 
individuals, one that contains two, five that con- 
tain one and three haystacks that contain none. 
Where small numbers are involved, random vari- 
ation will produce a variation in trait frequency 
within groups that produces an outcome that to 
the untrained eye might in fact look as if there 
had been some tendency for altruists to seek 
each other out and associate with them. But the 
process is essentially random. 
This point matters because as it stands, Berg- 
strom's logic appears to require as a precondi- 
tion for any operation of group selection that 
individuals be armed with machinery for seeking 
out and differentially assorting with other coop- 
erators. There is some experimental evidence 
that we have in fact acquired these capabilities, 
but to make it a precondition for the evolution 
of altruism raises unnecessarily the hurdles that 
group selection must overcome to be considered 
a potentially serious influence on human na- 
ture. It faces enough of these as things stand. 
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